The Liberal Peace Democracies don't fight one another. No case comes closer to violating this empirical law of international relations than the SpanishAmerican War
. Studies relying on the Polity III data set on political regimes point to this case as one of only a handful of cases of war between democracies (Farber & Gowa, 1995; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997; Jaggers & Gurr, 1995; Lake, 1992; Maoz, 1996) . The relative rarity of war and democracy in the international system renders judgments about this war and several other ambiguous cases extremely important for establishing the statistical validity of the liberal peace (Spiro, 1994) .
Advocates of the Kantian argument typically dispose of anomalies by claiming either that they did not represent cases of interstate war, or that one or both parties to the conflict were not true democracies. This war does not count, according to Russett or Ray, because Spain was not a democracy in 1898 (Ray, 1993 (Ray, , 1995 Russett, 1993, pp. 16-23) . This article seeks to move beyond the definitional debate to see what an in-depth case study of the behavior of the USA and Spain in this war can tell us about the democratic peace.
By the standards of the late 19th century, this could be considered a war between democracies. Spaniards and Americans, however, did not see themselves as being part of the 'liberal pacific union' envisioned by Immanuel Kant. Not only did Americans view Spain as being outside the moral realm of the pacific union, they overwhelmingly supported the war as a crusade to liberate Cuban 'freedom fighters' from Spanish tyranny.
This perception was crucial for the legitimation of a war fought to enhance the power and wealth of the United States. The USA fought to replace Spain as the dominant political and economic power on the island of Cuba. Within days of Commodore George Dewey's victory over a Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor on 1 May 1898, the US government began devising plans for domination over the Philippines as well. USA's imposition of colonial rule in the Philippines, however, generated substantial opposition at home and an insurgent movement in the Philippines. By contrast, US support for free and fair elections in Cuba to choose a nominally independent government proved popular in the USA and was accepted by most Cubans. US leaders, thus, discovered that the promotion of democracy and the idea of the liberal peace proved an effective way of building domestic and international support for an expansionist foreign policy.
This interpretation does not invalidate the liberal peace. Rather, it suggests that standard explanations of the liberal peace do not provide an adequate explanation of how the boundaries of that peace are determined. This article argues that the Spanish-American War can best be understood by 'constructivist' theories which focus on the power of global norms and shared identities in the international system. Two sets of factors drawn from constructivism are especially crucial for understanding this conflict: the presence or absence of a shared normative community and the capacity of powerful states to promulgate beliefs, both at home and abroad, that facilitate their pursuit of national interests.
First, the 'structural idealist' approach views the liberal pacific union as an 'intersubjective consensus' among liberal states that they belong to the same cooperative moral community (Wendt, 1994) . This approach departs from the institutional explanation for the democratic peace which emphasizes the political constraints imposed by republican government that limit the ability of liberal states to go to war (Gaubatz, 1991; Lake, 1992; Morgan and Campbell, 1991) . Instead, this account generally supports those who argue that liberal cultural norms of tolerance for self-determination and support for non-violent conflict resolution keep liberal states from fighting one another (Dixon, 1994; Doyle, 1983a; Russett, 1993) . It suggests, however, that actors' subjective judgments about the liberal status of potential allies or adversaries can often be more important than the concrete, objectively measurable characteristics of these states. Furthermore, the peaceful relations between liberal states are guided by a shared set of norms that transcend the cultural characteristics of individual states.
Second, a Gramscian argument interprets the idea of the liberal pacific union as an attempt by the American state to exercise an 'ideological hegemony' over its own citizens and subordinate states (Cox, 1986; Gill, 1993; Robinson, 1996) . Critics of the Kantian argument often emphasize power and national interest as an alternative to a focus on domestic political institutions and culture. The Gramscian approach, however, offers a way to integrate power considerations into an argument which still emphasizes the importance of shared liberal norms. Liberal ideology is an instrument used for the legitimation of US 'leadership' in the international system.
Neither of these constructivist approaches offers a complete understanding of the Spanish-American War or of the liberal peace. The structural idealist account underemphasizes the importance of the USA's national interests in shaping its decision to go to war in 1898. It obscures the crucial role of US power in the construction of the liberal peace during the 20th century. The Gramscian argument, however, cannot account for the genuine consensus among many American citizens that the war to liberate Cuba was a just war according to American liberal values. It obscures the crucial role of the USA's liberal culture in the exercise of US power. Combining these approaches, the central theoretical argument of this piece, with apologies to Alexander Wendt, is that the liberal peace is what powerful liberal states make of it (Wendt, 1992 (Carr, 1980; Kern, 1974) .
While the regent, Queen Maria Cristina, possessed important formal powers and played a limited role in the governance of the country, the civilian political leaders of the Cortes were the de facto rulers of Spain. These elected politicians governed in the name of the monarchy, but not under the full control of the monarch. Similarly, while the military was a powerful political institution, it did not govern the country. Only once during the Restoration had a military officer, General Arsenio Martinez Campos, held the premiership, and then only for six months in 1879.
If Spanish elections in rural districts had matched the free and fair character of electoral contests in many urban districts, Spain might have earned classification as a full-fledged democracy by the standards of 1898. A century of liberal land reforms, however, had created a powerful landed elite which used its economic and political power to dominate local electoral districts through a combination of fraud, intimidation, corruption and patronage (Kern, 1974, p. 33) . Control over the local electoral machinery allowed these elites to guarantee the selection of their hand-picked candidates for the Cortes. Both major parties were little more than a network of local 'caciques' and their political machines.
Even the alternation in power of the two major parties resulted from fraudulent elections. Antonio Canovas, the architect of the restoration system, encouraged the creation of the opposition Liberal Party. In its greater commitment to universal suffrage, anti-clericalism and free trade, the Liberal Party differed in important ways from the Liberal Conservatives, but it shared a broad commitment to the political, economic and social order of the restoration regime (Carr, 1980 , p. 10). These parties entered first into an implicit understanding that they would alternate in power and later agreed to the somewhat more overt Pacto del Pardo in 1883, which solidified the cooperative relationship between the two major parties (Kemrn, 1974, pp. 67-68). Elections were rigged to guarantee that the predetermined victor would achieve a parliamentary majority.
This characteristic of the Spanish regime suggests that Spain had not achieved the status of a fully consolidated democracy, but was in transition to democracy. Recent studies of democratization argue that explicit negotiated agreements among major power contenders are often necessary for the construction of new democracies (Karl, 1990 ; O'Donneli & Schmitter, 1986). Indeed, Canovas created the turno pacifico for the same reason that modemrn democratic pacts are formed between contending political parties. Parties that were guaranteed their turn in power would not call upon the military to unseat the incumbents (Carr, 1980 , pp. 7-10).
The formal power of the monarchy, the potential power of the military, and the corruption in the electoral system have led many scholars to conclude that Spain had not surpassed the minimum threshold to be considered a democracy (Carr, 1980; Kern, 1974; Ray, 1995, pp. 158-200) . There is evidence, however, to suggest that Spain could be considered at least partially democratic or in transition to democracy at this time. The Polity III data set awarded it a score of six on its eleven-point democracy scale, a score which reasonably suggests that Spain was a borderline democracy in 1898 (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995) . At the least, Spanish democracy was sufficiently robust that the SpanishAmerican War cannot be easily discarded on the basis of coding error. Spain's often liberal behavior in the months leading to war provides more evidence in support of the idea that this could be considered a war between democracies.
Spain's behavior did not fully live up to the expectations of the Kantian argument. Rather than seeing itself as part of a community of liberal states, Spain consistently looked to the great monarchies of Europe to intercede on its behalf (May, 1961 Many scholars suggest that Spain was merely trying to buy time with its reform policies and was not serious about meeting US demands (Gould, 1980; Morgan, 1965 What this experience shows is that the USA did forge a 'collective identity' consistent with the liberal argument that transcended purely national self-interest. It identified with the Cubans rather than with Spain, however. It empathized with the Cubans because they saw them as the moral equivalent of the USA's founding fathers fighting for liberty against colonialism.
Imperialism was probably the most fundamental barrier to establishing a collective identity among the liberal states of the late 19th century (Blank, 1996) . For Britain and France, the problem was their competition for imperial possessions. For the USA, its colonial past led it to be extremely wary of cooperation with imperialist European states, regardless of how liberal they appeared. The same sentiments that brought about war with Spain had taken the USA to the brink of war with Great Britain three years earlier (Owen, 1994 (Gould, 1980, pp.  114-115; Trask, 1981, pp. 377-388) .
The USA also intervened to pursue its economic interests, which were considerable and direct in Cuba (Perez, 1983) . The insurrection had disrupted Cuban exports of sugar and tobacco to the USA and had endangered US-owned sugar plantations. US exporters supported the war to dismantle the colonial preferential tariffs that kept their goods out of Cuba. New opportunities for economic gain emerged after the war as the USA became Cuba's dominant trading partner and US investors poured nearly two billion dollars into Cuba by World War I, a total greater than in any other country. The United States had very few economic ties with the Philippines prior to 1898. These islands were most important as a gateway to the huge potential market in China (LaFeber, 1963). After Dewey's victory, US policy-makers also began to consider the economic benefits of control over the Philippines' exports and access to its market.
Enhancing the capabilities of US naval forces provided another important material interest for the war with Spain. The Navy hoped to keep European powers from challenging US naval domination of the Caribbean. Thus, the Platt Amendment insisted that Cuba lease Guantanamo Bay as a coaling station (Congress, 1901 (Congress, , p. 2954 . Protecting the USA's Pacific coast and maritime trade to Asia required coaling stations throughout the Pacific. The aftermath of the war provided the USA with a series of naval bases that greatly enhanced US capabilities in the Pacific. The importance of this factor is reflected in the fact that the USA nearly decided to ask Spain only for a coaling station at Subic Bay after its victory (Gould, 1980, p. 117) .
There was also a broader sense that an expansionist foreign policy was a natural response to the USA's growth as a world power. For many, the annexation of Cuba was seen as an extension of the manifest destiny expansionism that had dominated the formation of the continental republic. Cuba was, after all, 'a mere extension of our Atlantic coast line', according to Sen. Albert Beveridge (Perez, 1983 (Foner, 1972, p. 13) . Furthermore, the insurgent strategy against Spain had been to destroy the sugar economy of Cuba (Foner, 1972 , pp. 14-34). McKinley did not want to make any 'embarrassing commitments' to a movement that Grover Cleveland's Secretary of State, Richard Olney, had dismissed as a gang of arsonists (Atkins, 1926, pp. 213-214) .
McKinley's analysis of the capabilities of the Filipinos to govern their own affairs was equally pessimistic. He could not leave the Filipinos to themselves, McKinley explained to a group of ministers, 'for anarchy and bloodshed would follow in the wake of native ignorance and inability to govern; so there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ died' (Morgan, 1965, p. 96) .
The USA's material interests demanded that friendly and stable governments ruled in Cuba and the Philippines. The McKinley Administration's belief that neither nation could produce such a government led it to exercise direct political control over both possessions. Within a year, however, McKinley was pursuing very different policies in these two cases. The Gramscian approach can help to explain these divergent paths. More importantly, it can help illuminate the consequences of failing to assert an ideological hegemony over subordinate states.
Ideological Hegemony and the US Occupations of Cuba and the Philippines
The USA asserted naked domination over Filipinos and was met with armed rebellion in the Philippines and substantial domestic opposition. It pursued a more liberal policy in Cuba, at least partially in tune with the rhetoric that had legitimated the war. This policy was more successful in dampening opposition to US domination in Cuba and in crafting a domestic consensus in support of US policy. Neither of these outcomes was predetermined. Rather, they reflected a difficult struggle and trial and error process through which the USA began to construct a new identity for itself as a global power.
US forces began preparing for a long-term occupation of Cuba by informing their Cuban allies that, 'interference from any quarter would not be permitted. The Cuban insurgents ... must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States' (State, 1902, p. 230) . To impose its authority, the USA posted more than 45,000 troops in Cuba, a force three times the size of the one that had engaged the Spanish at Santiago (War, 1904, pp. 16-17) . By the end of the first year of the occupation, however, McKinley had decided to turn Cuba into a US protectorate to be governed by a president and legislature chosen in free and fair elections (War, 1904, pp. 41-44 Without a credible pledge that it would fulfill the terms of the Teller Amendment, the USA could have found itself at war with the Liberating Army. Instead, the Cubans disbanded their army to convince the USA that they were worthy of self-government. US officials still wanted to annex Cuba, but they realized that forcible annexation could lead to war with remobilized veterans of that army. Gen. Wood embodied the solution to this dilemma. 'Forcible annexation he had refused to consider; annexation by guile he had effectively opposed; but annexation by acclamation had been his dream from the beginning' (Hagedorn, 1931, p. 371) . Wood wanted to prepare the Cubans for independence in such a manner that they would want to join the union of their own free will. As Secretary of War Elihu Root explained, 'It is better to have the favors of a lady with her consent, after judicious courtship, than to ravish her' (Perez, 1983, p. 279) .
In essence, the USA employed a Gramscian strategy designed to achieve domination over Cuba through the establishment of an ideological hegemony over the island's inhabitants. Wood attempted to create a coalition of local elites who would see annexation to the USA as the appropriate destiny for Cuba. The most crucial element of this coalition was the Cuban expatriate community. A majority of the Cubans chosen to serve in the occupation government were the English-speaking, naturalized US citizens associated with the Cuban Junta (Perez, 1983 , pp. 284-301). These Cubans possessed strong separatist credentials acquired during the war with Spain, but, like President Estrada Palma, warmly embraced the idea of a close relationship with the USA.
Root and Wood sought to legitimize this path by ensuring that the 'better elements' of Cuban society, rather than the most radical proponents of Cuba Libre, were selected by the Cuban people in 'free and fair' elections. They constructed an electoral law that allowed only male property-owners, literates, and Liberating Army veterans to vote because they believed that universal adult male suffrage would lead to victories by the most revolutionary elements of the Liberating Army. Wood took the extra step of encouraging the formation of a pro-USA political party and campaigning for its candidates.
Rather than elect the 'best men' to represent them, however, the Cubans sent representatives of 'the extreme and revolutionary element' connected to the Liberating Army to the Constitutional Convention in September 1900. 'I should say that we have about ten absolutely first class men and about fifteen men of doubtful qualifications and character and about six of the worst rascals and fakirs in Cuba', Wood reported to Washington (Healy, 1963, p. 148) . The electoral victories of the most radical elements of the Cuban revolutionary coalition signaled a defeat for the purest expression of the US effort to assert an ideological hegemony over Cuba. These elections, however, effectively demobilized the most dangerous opponents of US domination over Cuba. Their victories caused the strongest advocates of Cuban independence to support a protectorate relationship with the USA. In February 1901, the Senate passed the Platt Amendment, which in addition to the provisions noted above gave the USA the right to intervene at its discretion to protect stable 'constitutional' government in Cuba (Congress, 1901, p. 2954) .
Congress supported this amendment because it reflected a reasonable compromise for members who wanted either to fulfill the promise of the Teller Amendment or to continue US domination over the island. This solution, which was attached as an appendix to the Cuban constitution, was also accepted by most Cubans. The USA failed in its most ambitious Gramscian project of annexation by acclamation, but the relative peace with which Cubans accepted US domination stood in stark contrast to the US experience in the Philippines.
The initial relationship between the US military and the Philippine rebels was strikingly similar to the US relationship with the Liberating Army in Cuba. Commodore Dewey had brought the exiled Emilio Aguinaldo back to the Philippines in hopes that he could help in the war effort, but within weeks US officials were trying to exclude his forces from participating in the defeat of Spain (State, 1904 We crushed the only republic in Asia. We made war on the only Christian people in the East. We converted a war of glory into a war of shame. We vulgarized the American flag. We introduced perfidy into the practice of war. We inflicted torture on unarmed men to extort confession. We put children to death. We established reconcentrado camps ... We baffled the aspirations of a people for liberty (Beisner, 1968, p. 162 More broadly, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the liberal states of that day saw themselves as being part of a larger community. There was no liberal pacific union in 1898 because there was no intersubjective consensus around the importance of a shared liberal identity. The origins of such a collective identity can be seen in the democratic coalitions forged during the two world wars and in the western alliance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today, there is probably no greater fulfillment of the Kantian vision than the European Union. The main point of the structural idealist argument is that the liberal peace does not emerge naturally from shared liberal characteristics. It must be constructed.
The broad lesson of the Gramscian approach is that the liberal peace cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the central role of US power in constructing the pacific union. Throughout the 20th century, the USA has possessed the power to help shape the moral boundaries of the liberal community. Thus, partially liberal Spain was painted in starkly autocratic terms when the USA needed to legitimate going to war against it. The ambiguous regime of Wilhelmine Germany was treated to the same kind of demonization when Wilson decided to enter World War I 'to make the world safe for democracy' (Oren, 1995 In a more crucial legacy of the SpanishAmerican War, the USA learned how to use the promotion of democracy and the idea of the liberal pacific union to achieve its material interests. Promoting the war as necessary for the liberation of Cuba from Spanish tyranny helped build a powerful domestic consensus in the USA in favor of the war. By granting independence to a freely elected government in Cuba, the USA convinced many Cubans that it was in their interest to pursue policies in the interest of the United States. Although the USA failed in its most ambitious efforts to assert an ideological hegemony in favor of annexation by acclamation, Cubans accepted US leadership much more readily than did Filipinos. Thus, the promotion of democracy served to legitimate US expansionism at home and abroad.
The success of the US occupation of Cuba, in comparison to the Philippine experience, led US policy-makers to emulate the Cuban rather than the Philippine model in subsequent interventions in the Third World. After the debacle in the Philippines, the United States would never again try to impose colonial government on a subordinate people. By the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the USA had taken definitive steps towards eventually granting the Philippines its independence. Teaching Central Americans and the inhabitants of Caribbean isles to 'elect good men' became the centerpiece of US interventions in the Caribbean Basin between 1898 and 1934 (Drake, 1991) . The USA promoted democracy, or at least the liberalization of allied regimes, during nearly every one of its 20th-century military interventions in the Third World (Peceny, 1995) .
The US occupations of Japan and West Germany after World War II provide excellent examples of the Gramscian dynamic at work. The United States convinced large numbers of Japanese and German citizens that it occupied their countries as liberators, not conquerors (Smith, 1994) . The US occupation governments worked from the premise that a magnanimous policy designed to create prosperous liberal capitalist democracies would encourage these countries to be willing partners of the USA in the postwar order. Indeed, these two countries did become crucial allies and friends of the United States in the free world coalition against the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, institutions created under US leadership, like NATO, GATT, and the European Community helped make the liberal pacific union a reality in the western world. The Clinton Administration continues this Gramscian tradition by pursuing 'democratic enlargement' in order to create a world more congenial to US material interests. Today, however, we are trying to convince Russians that liberal capitalist democracy represents the liberation of the Russian people, not their domination by the victor of the Cold War.
In conclusion, the liberal pacific union is 'an enduring social fact' of international relations (Wendt, 1994) . But, it is real in large part because the leaders and citizens of liberal states believe it to be true and because the most powerful country on earth has a material interest in making it so.
